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Abstract
Convergence between commodity futures prices and the underlying physical assets at each contract’s expiration date is a pivotal condition for the
market’s functioning. Between 2005 and 2010, convergence failed for several U.S. grain markets. This article presents a price pressure-augmented
commodity storage model that links the scale of nonconvergence to financial investment channeled through indices, which are traded in commodity
futures markets. The model is empirically tested, using Markov regime-switching regression analysis. Regression results strongly support the
model’s predicted link between index investment and the extent of nonconvergence for three grains traded at the Chicago Board of Trade: wheat,
corn, and soybeans.
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1. Introduction
Nonconvergence between commodity futures and their un-
derlying physical assets undermines the functioning of com-
modity markets. Episodes of prolonged convergence failure
have occurred across commodities since the early 2000s, but
have been especially pronounced in three U.S. grain markets:
Chicago Board of Trade (CBT) wheat, corn, and soybeans (Ad-
jemian et al., 2013). These episodes of nonconvergence coin-
cided with two global food crises in 2007–2008 and 2010–2011
and a growing concern over the potentially inflationary price
effect of novel trading instruments, such as commodity indices
(Ghosh, 2010).
The United States is the single largest exporter of wheat and
corn and the third largest exporter of soybeans, globally. High
prices, as quoted at the U.S. food commodity exchanges in 2008
and 2010, transmitted into local consumer markets and triggered
a panic in governments across the world over domestic food
security. These concerns resulted in export bans of key staples—
some of which had previously been unaffected by the price spike
(Headey, 2011; Timmer, 2009). Increasing and more volatile
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global food prices caused economic and political instability,
hitting hard the livelihoods of the poorest (Dorward, 2011;
Harrigan, 2014; Nissanke, 2012; Tadesse et al., 2014).
Empirical evidence for a causal link between financial invest-
ment and commodity price dynamics has been mixed; see Irwin
(2013) and Cheng and Xiong (2014), for comprehensive litera-
ture reviews. Most empirical studies have focused on the impact
of commodity indices on price levels and volatilities, such as
Ott (2014), Sanders and Irwin (2017), and Algieri (2014, 2016).
Few have looked at convergence, market basis, or term struc-
ture effects. This article reinvestigates the link between finan-
cial investment and commodity price dynamics, by examining
episodes of prolonged nonconvergence in U.S. grain markets.
The literature, which investigates these episodes of conver-
gence failure, pinpoints the anomaly as a misalignment between
the exchange storage premium and commercial storage rates,
paired with a change in delivery instruments (Aulerich et al.,
2011; Garcia et al., 2015; Irwin et al., 2011). These factors
are thought to have jointly contributed to limits to arbitrage
and, hence, facilitated nonconvergence. Although the potential
link between financial investment and convergence failure was
considered (U.S. Senate, 2009), it has not yet been incorpo-
rated formally, and only two studies have empirically tested the
hypothesized link (Garcia et al., 2015; Irwin et al., 2011).
The reasons for nonconvergence, identified in the literature,
are not challenged here. Instead, the article argues that the
extent of nonconvergence—the size of the market basis at a
C© 2017 The Authors. Agricultural Economics published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on
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contract’s maturity date—cannot be fully explained by these
same conditions that caused limits to arbitrage. The article de-
rives a price pressure-augmented commodity storage model,
showing that, while nonconvergence is facilitated by a mis-
match in storage rates that hinders the execution of arbitrage
trades, the large scale of nonconvergence is caused by financial
investment-induced price pressure effects. This link between
financial investment and the extent of nonconvergence has been
overlooked by previous studies. The reason for this oversight
is that previous studies build on the theory of storage, but ig-
nore theories of price pressure. The model is fitted by Markov
regime-switching regressions, which yield strong support for
the model’s predictions.
Two policy implications arise from this analysis. The vari-
able storage rate (VSR), that has been designed to alleviate the
misalignment between storage rates and thereby restore con-
vergence, is only partially effective, unless financial investment
is also curbed. In the United States, concerns over the potential
link between financial investment and high commodity prices
led to the passage of the Dodd–Frank Act in 2010. The Act em-
powers the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
to impose position limits for traders other than commercial
hedgers, to curb potentially adverse effects of financial invest-
ment on price discovery and effectiveness of risk management.
However, it is argued that position limits as introduced by the
Act fail to deliver the intended effect and, therefore, cannot
complement the VSR.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Based on
a review of conventional arbitrage theories, Section 2 derives a
price pressure-augmented commodity storage model that links
the size of the market basis at a commodity futures contract’s
maturity date to price pressure effects. Section 3 introduces
econometric methods and data used to test the model. Section
4 reports and discusses empirical results. Section 5 highlights
the shortcomings of the VSR, in the light of findings presented
in the article. Section 6 concludes with some considerations of
policy implications.
2. Explaining convergence failure
2.1. Previous explanations for convergence failure
Two arbitrage mechanisms ensure a close relationship be-
tween prices in commodity futures and their underlying phys-
ical markets: fundamental and spatial arbitrage. Fundamental
arbitrage opportunities arise if the price in either the cash or
futures market deviates from its fundamental value. Spatial ar-
bitrage opportunities arise if prices in two markets trading the
same product deviate after adjustments for exchange rates and
transport costs.
In the absence of tariffs, transaction costs, or other mar-
ket distortions, the mechanics of arbitrage ensure convergence
of futures and cash prices at each futures contract’s matu-
rity. However, futures and cash prices can deviate substan-
tially over a contract’s life cycle, despite common fundamen-
tals. The cyclical deviations are explained by two complemen-
tary theory strands: theories of storage (Brennan, 1958; Kaldor,
1939; Working, 1948, 1949) and of risk premium (Hicks, 1939;
Keynes, 1930).
Equation (1) summarizes the arbitrage relationship between
cash and futures markets under theories of storage:
Ft,t+1 = St (1 + rt ) + δt − y(It ), (1)
with Ft,t+1 being the futures price at time t and with maturity
date t + 1, St the cash price,1 δt storage cost over one period, rt
interest paid on the initial cash outlay over one period, and yt
the convenience yield. The latter is a utility-based reward that
accrues to a holder of inventory and is inversely related to the
level of inventory available, It .
The market basis is defined as Bt ≡ St − Ft,t+1. A negative
basis cannot exceed St rt + δt with y(It ) = 0 (physical full
carry), since rt , δt , y(It ) ≥ 0 (Lautier, 2005). A positive basis,
in contrast, depends on the “size” of the convenience yield.
What distinguished nonconvergence in U.S. grain markets
from other such incidence and, hence, attracted attention was
that futures contracts traded far above cash market prices (see
Figure 1A in the Online Appendix). The rule that a negative
basis cannot exceed the carry was, therefore, consecutively vi-
olated, which can only be explained by limits to arbitrage under
Eq. (1).
Several studies identified three interlinked factors that have
contributed to limits to arbitrage: (1) a misalignment between
the storage premium paid by the holder of a delivery instrument
and the storage cost paid by a holder of the physical commodity
(Garcia et al., 2015); (2) a change in delivery instruments, which
provided the holder of the instrument with the option but not
the obligation to take delivery (Aulerich et al., 2011); and (3) a
high carry that fully compensates for the storage cost incurred
by those holding inventory (Irwin et al., 2011). These three
factors incentivized traders to postpone load-out, postponing
the execution of spatial arbitrage.
Although these factors explain limits to spatial arbitrage and,
thereby, the incidence of nonconvergence, they do not explain
the extent of nonconvergence. The exception here is Garcia
et al. (2015)—who proposed a “dynamic rational expectations
commodity storage model,” in which nonconvergence of the
extent observed empirically could arise in equilibrium when
the price of physical storage δt − y(It ) was greater than the
cost of holding the delivery instrument γt . They showed that the
difference, or “wedge,” wt ≡ δt − y(It ) − γt , between storage
costs drives the basis at maturity. The authors argued that “a
relatively small wedge term in period t can have a large effect
on the basis if it is expected to persist for an extended period,”
that is, if traders expect persistent convergence failure (Garcia
et al., 2015, p. 47).
1 The “cash price,” often denoted as “spot price,” is commonly approximated
with the closest-to-maturity futures price. Since the debate here emphasizes the
distinct dynamics in the physical and derivative markets, we retain the term
“cash price.”
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Based on this reasoning, the CBT adjusted its exchange stor-
age premium by introducing the VSR, and, as it successfully
restored convergence, the inconsistency of storage costs hy-
pothesis became the consensus explanation for the extent of
nonconvergence in U.S. grain markets.
However, the model proposed by Garcia et al. (2015) rests
on the implicit, but essential, assumption that the fundamentals
differ, by which traders in physical and futures markets evaluate
the respective commodity, resulting in Et [Ft+1,t+1] = Et [St+1].
This apparently violates the fundamental arbitrage condition
under which Et [Ft+1,t+1] = Ft,t+1 = Et [St+1] = St+1 . How-
ever, the violation can be retained if risk premium theories are
considered, a fact overlooked by Garcia et al. (2015), as their
model was built on theories of storage, but ignored theories of
risk premium.
Theories of risk premium suggest that futures prices are sub-
ject to a premium, which compensates speculators for taking
on hedgers’ risk. Futures prices exceed cash prices (contango)
if consumers dominate, or cash prices exceed futures prices
(backwardation) if producers dominate the market. This idea is
motivated by the theory of “normal backwardation,” advanced
by Keynes (1930) and later taken up by price pressure theories,
which derive the premium from “excess” demand for hedging
positions under the assumption of market frictions (Acharya
et al., 2013; Bessembinder, 1992; Chang, 1985; Hirshleifer,
1988, 1990). The risk premium, ρt , set out in Eq. (2), implies
that the futures price is a biased estimator of the future cash
price:
Ft,t+1 = Et [St+1] − ρt . (2)
The price pressure interpretation of the risk premium pro-
vides a foundation for the argument that the arrival of novel trad-
ing instruments, foremost commodity indices, has contributed
to the increase in commodity futures prices in 2008 and 2010.
Index traders are particularly likely to drive a premium due
to their unique investment behavior. These traders are “long
only” and passive in the market, as they invest in a large bas-
ket of commodities by taking buy positions. Therefore, index
positions are relatively inelastic, with respect to market fun-
damentals (Guilleminot et al., 2014; Mayer, 2012; Nissanke,
2012; Tang and Xiong, 2012).
Index traders reduce hedging pressure, acting as counterparty
to hedgers (Brunetti and Reiffen, 2014). If, however, net long
index positions exceed net short hedging positions, additional
short traders are needed to cover the remaining long positions.
This arguably results in a positive bias of the futures price over
the cash price. This phenomenon is henceforth referred to as
index pressure.
Index pressure is likely to be reinforced by traders following
trends instead of fundamentals. Such trend-following behavior
is prevalent in commodity futures markets due to a known in-
formation asymmetry between large physical traders and small
speculators (Cheng and Xiong, 2014).
This article draws on the model of Garcia et al. (2015) and
risk premium theories to derive a price pressure-augmented
commodity storage model. The model shows that if limits to
spatial arbitrage exist, index and hedging pressure will show in
the extent of nonconvergence.
2.2. A price pressure-augmented storage model
Recalling Eq. (1), Eq. (3) must hold under spatial, as well as
fundamental arbitrage:
St = Ft,t+1(1 + rt ) − δt + y(It ). (3)
At a futures contract maturity date, the agent who is long in
the market faces two choices, of which the maximum payoff
must define the futures price at maturity:
Ft,t = max
{ Ft,t+1
(1+rt ) − γt (i)
St (ii)
. (4)
The first strategy in Eq. (4) implies that the long trader holds
the delivery instrument until the next contract’s maturity at the
premium charge γt set by the exchange. For the second strategy,
the trader takes delivery. Given Eq. (3), the second strategy is
equivalent to a trader taking delivery and holding the bulk of
grain over one period for future sale at the expected price Ft,t+1,
so that:
Ft,t = max
{
Ft,t+1
(1+rt ) − γt (i)
Ft,t+1
(1+rt ) − δt + y(It ) (ii)
. (5)
If (i) > (ii), that is, γt < δt − y(It ), then a trader gains by
holding the delivery instrument and postponing load-out, lead-
ing to a lack in spatial arbitrage trade. The increased demand for
delivery instruments puts upward pressure on the price for such
instruments. This price, however, is fixed by the exchange and,
hence, cannot vary, so the size of the basis Bt ≡ St − Ft,t at
maturity t is given by Eq. (6):
Bt = max
{
γt − δt + y(It ) (i)
0 (ii) . (6)
Equation (6) implies that the extent of nonconvergence is
related to the difference between the storage exchange premium
and storage costs in the physical market, plus convenience yield.
This is the “wedge,” described by Garcia et al. (2015).
From Eq. (6), implications for the market’s term structure can
be derived. Given the size of the price spread between the con-
tract maturing next and the one that will mature subsequently
to the first, Z2−1 ≡ Ft,t+1 − Ft,t is limited by the financial full
carry condition, i.e., Ft,t ≥ Ft,t+1(1+rt ) − γt , and we can define the
excess in the spread as 0 ≥ Ft,t+1(1+rt ) − γt − Ft,t , so that:
Z2−1 = min
{
0 (i)
−γt + δt − y(It ) (ii) . (7)
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Table 1
Size of the “edge” for 2008 CBOT wheat contracts
May–Jul 2008 Jul–Sep 2008 Sep–Dec 2008
Days between maturities 61 60 91
Physical storage
(cents/day/bushel)
0.237 0.237 0.237
Exchange premium
(cents/day/bushel)
0.150 0.165 0.165
Physical storage costs
(cents/bushel)
15.572 15.299 23.092
Exchange premium costs
(cents/bushel)
9.870 10.667 16.010
Difference (cents/bushel) 5.702 4.633 6.993
Basis at maturity
(cents/bushel)
202.500 199.300 144.300
Source: Own calculation based on data obtained from Thomson Reuters Datas-
tream, CME Group Registrar, and Irwin et al. (2011).
Case (i) is given if Ft,t = Ft,t+1(1+rt ) − γt , which is case (i) in Eq.(5), with γt < δt − y(It ).
Case (ii) is given if Ft,t = Ft,t+1(1+rt ) − δt + y(It ), which is case (ii)
in Eq. (5), with γt ≥ δt − y(It ).
Therefore, the market is either in full carry with nonconver-
gence, as in case (i) in Eqs. (5)–(7), or below full carry with
convergence, as in case (ii) in Eqs. (5)–(7). As in Garcia et al.
(2015), the model provides an explanation for the high carry
that coincided with nonconvergence.
While the difference in storage costs explains limits to spa-
tial arbitrage and the high carry, the model is yet incomplete,
as the difference alone cannot account for the extent of non-
convergence. For example, the storage premium at the CBT
wheat market was set at 0.150 cents per bushel per day until
July 2008, and raised to 0.165 thereafter, which aggregates to
4.5 and 4.95 cents per bushel per month, respectively. In mid
2008, the CBT conducted a survey of 47 firms, which found an
average physical storage rate of 7.1 cents per bushel per month
(Irwin et al., 2011).
Table 1 shows the days between two consecutive contracts’
maturities, the physical storage rate, and the exchange premium,
with the latter two measures in cents (US$) per day per bushel. It
further presents an estimate of storage costs and exchange pre-
mium costs incurred by holding the physical product and deliv-
ery instrument, respectively, from one futures contract maturity
to the next futures contract maturity, plus interest (three-month
LIBOR rate plus 200 basis points). The “difference” presents
case (i) in Eq. (6) under the assumption that convenience yield
is negligible in a regime of abundant storage. The basis was 50
times as large as predicted by Eq. (6).
It is clear from Table 1 that the extent of nonconvergence
cannot be explained solely by differences in storage cost—an
explanation that would be compatible with effective fundamen-
tal arbitrage and limits to spatial arbitrage. To explain the ex-
cessive market basis, Garcia et al. (2015) implicitly assumed
Et [Ft+1,t+1] = Et [St+1]. This assumption is essential to relate
the basis size to the continuously discounted difference in the
expected prices on both markets, so that Eq. (6) can be extended
to Eq. (8):
Bt = max
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Et [St+1]−Et[Ft+1,t+1]
(1+rt ) + γt − δt + y(It ) (i)
γt − δt + y(It ) (ii)
0 (iii)
. (8)
However, rejection of fundamental arbitrage is in fact unnec-
essary. Since from Eq. (2), Et [St+1] − Et [Ft+1,t+1] = ρt , Eq.
(8) can be rewritten as:
Bt = max
⎧⎨
⎩
ρt
(1+rt ) + γt − δt + y(It ) (i)
γt − δt + y(It ) (ii)
0 (iii)
. (9)
If spatial arbitrage is effective, case (iii) prevails and con-
vergence is established. If limits to spatial arbitrage arise and
ρt = 0, case (ii) results, and the basis is linked to the “wedge”
only. If ρt = 0, the basis at maturity is driven by the “wedge”
plus the discounted risk premium, which, in turn, is driven by
hedging and index pressure, giving rise to case (i).
With no limits to spatial arbitrage, cash and futures prices
would be bound by the law of one price, and price signals
would spill over from one market to the other. In this case, the
size of the index pressure effect would be hidden under feed-
back effects between cash and futures markets. The extent to
which the cash price is affected by index and trend-following
investment in the futures market then depends, inter alia, on the
reaction of physical traders to changes in futures prices, the ex-
istence of a liquid cash market, and information availability on
market fundamentals. However, if and only if spatial arbitrage
is limited, the index premium is directly observable in the form
of a large basis.
As can be seen from Eqs. (7) and (9), implications of our
model are largely in line with predictions 1–3 and 5 (Garcia
et al., 2015, p. 13). However, we differ in prediction 4, which
links the growth in the extent of nonconvergence to the size of
the “wedge’ component.” This does not follow from our model,
which links dynamics in the extent of nonconvergence to the
risk premium, in addition to the wedge component. The former
varies with the composition of traders in the futures market.
3. Data and methodology
Based on Eq. (9), we estimate the following regression equa-
tion:
Bt = β ′ Zt + ut , (10)
with Bt being the market basis at maturity and Zt a vector of
explanatory variables. Under effective arbitrage, that is, case
(iii) of Eq. (9), Bt = 0, and under limits to arbitrage, that
is, cases (i) and (ii) of Eq. (9), Bt = β ′ Zt . To account for
the two different market regimes, a regime-switching model is
estimated, in addition to the baseline model in Eq. (10).
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For the regime-switching model, it is assumed that limits to
spatial arbitrage introduce a break in the “normal” market be-
havior, that is, coefficients are assumed to vary between the two
regimes (Hamilton, 2008). The regime-switching regression is
specified in Eq. (11), with st being a random variable that as-
sumes values st = 1, or st = 2 to differentiate between con-
verging and nonconverging regimes. The probabilistic model
of what causes the change from st = 1 to st = 2 is based
on a two-state Markov chain with constant regime-switching
probabilities:
Bt = β ′st Zt + εt . (11)
The set of explanatory variables, Zt in Eqs. (10) and (11),
comprises the exchange storage premium γt obtained from the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME); convenience yield y(It ),
modeled as a function of inventory, is approximated by begin-
ning stocks and the stock-to-use ratio obtained from the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA); and the risk premium ρt ,
approximated by two different measures for hedging and index
pressure constructed from CFTC reports. Since the functional
form of y(It ) is unknown, inventory in levels and inventory
squared, as well as the stock-to-use ratio, are used. Storage
costs, δt , are unavailable and approximated with the level of
inventories δ(It ). Variables and their data sources are listed in
Table 1A in the Online Appendix.
The data ranges from January 2006 to August 2015 for soy-
beans, and March 2006 to July 2015 for wheat and corn.2
CBT corn and wheat futures contracts are available for the
delivery months March, May, July, September, and December,
while CBT soybeans futures contracts are available for January,
March, May, July, August, September, and November delivery.
The five-day price average of the second week into the deliv-
ery month is used for the futures price at maturity. Over the
same five days, the averages of the respective cash prices are
calculated to construct the basis at maturity.
The stock-to-use ratio is calculated as the total disappearance
over ending stocks. USDA-observed inventory data is available
in quarters of marketing years.3 Beginning stocks are paired
with the months at the beginning of each quarter, and the stock-
to-use ratio with the ending months of each quarter.4 Inventory
data for the missing months are interpolated by inverse distance
weighting method. By using beginning stocks instead of ending
stocks, we control for potential endogeneity between inventory
and market basis.5 As an alternative measure of inventory that
2 Garcia et al. (2015) had access to nonpublicly available index position data
from early 2004.
3 For soft red winter wheat: Jun–Aug (Q1), Sep–Nov (Q2), Dec–Feb (Q3),
and Mar–May (Q4). For corn and soybeans: Sep–Nov (Q1), Dec–Feb (Q2),
Mar–May (Q3), and Jun–Aug (Q4).
4 For example, June with Q1 for wheat beginning stocks and August with Q1
for wheat stock-to-use ratio.
5 Garcia et al. (2015) used instrumental variable estimation instead to ensure
exogeneity of inventory approximated by ending stocks. Since beginning stocks
are equivalent to lagged ending stocks, exogeneity is ensured here.
does not rely on interpolation, monthly updated USDA projec-
tions of the annual crop supply are used.
The CFTC provides a breakdown of each Tuesday’s open
interest by different trader types for U.S. futures exchanges in
three weekly flagship reports. Among these reports, the Com-
modity Index Trader Supplement (CIT) reflects index positions
most accurately and, therefore, is chosen for this study (Ir-
win and Sanders, 2012). Traders’ weight of market, defined
as the percentage share of different trader types—commercial
hedgers, noncommercial speculators, and index investors—in
open interest, is used as an indicator for index and hedging pres-
sure. Traders’ net long position, defined as net long position (in
absolute values) over total open interest, is considered as an
alternative indicator.
All series are in logarithms to adjust for differences in scale.
Market basis and carry variables are found stationary, while
some of the trader position indicators are first difference station-
ary (see Table 2A in the Online Appendix). Since some explana-
tory variables might contain a unit root, Newey and West (1987)
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard er-
rors are used to avoid spurious inference in potentially unbal-
anced regressions (Ventosa-Santaularia, 2012). Also, special
attention is paid to parameter instability, indicative of structural
breaks with the use of Hansen (1992) parameter instability test.
Given Eq. (9), we expect confirmation of the following rela-
tionships:
(a) The market basis increases with convenience yield and de-
creases with storage costs. Since y(It ) is a negative function
of It , but a positive function of the stock-to-use ratio, and
δ(It ) a positive function of It , the basis is inversely re-
lated to the level of inventory and positively related to the
stock-to-use ratio.
(b) Nonconvergence is curbed with a decrease in the storage
costs differential. Therefore, market basis increases with
the storage premium γt .
(c) The futures price has a positive premium over the cash
price if index pressure prevails, and a negative premium if
hedging pressure prevails. Therefore, the market basis is
inversely related to the weight of portfolio insurance and
uninformed traders, and positively related to the weight of
hedgers.
(d) At maturity, relationships (i)–(iii) are relevant only if lim-
its to spatial arbitrage are present. Coefficient estimates
should be smaller, approaching zero, under effective spa-
tial arbitrage.
4. Empirical results
The CBT wheat market is by far the most affected by index
pressure. Index positions outweigh hedging positions in most
instances, so that index pressure prevails. For the CBT corn
market, index pressure was particularly present from mid 2008
to mid 2010, in early 2012, and from 2013 until early 2016.
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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
(a) CBT Wheat
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
(b) CBT Corn
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
(c) CBT Soybeans
index pressure hedging pressure
Fig. 1. Hedging and index pressure in U.S. grain markets Jan. 2006–Jan. 2016.
Note: If net long index positions outweigh net short hedging positions, the time period is defined as index pressure. If net short hedging positions outweigh net long
index positions, the time period is defined as hedging pressure.
Source: Author’s calculation based on CFTC and CIT.
The situation is similar for the CBT soybeans market, with the
exception that the last period of index pressure starts instead
from mid 2014 (Fig. 1).
Given the prevalence of index pressure in CBT wheat, the
premium of futures over cash prices is expected to be largest
on average in wheat, compared to the two other grain markets.
Table 2 summarizes the estimation results for Eq. (10) with
two model specifications, which vary only in risk premium
variables. Model I tests jointly for hedging and index pressure
effects, while Model II tests for the index pressure-augmenting
effect of trend-following speculators, by including the market
weight of uninformed traders.
Consistent with relationship (a), the stock-to-use ratio is pos-
itively related to the market basis for corn and soybeans. A
doubling in the stock-to-use ratio results in a 1.2–1.5% increase
in market basis. A direct interpretation of the inventory co-
efficients is not possible due to the polynomial nature of the
convenience yield. Coefficients for level of inventory and level
of inventory squared are highly significant for all three markets,
supporting the hypothesis that inventory is the main driver of
nonconvergence, as suggested by Garcia et al. (2015).6
Index pressure effects are found to be significant in all three
markets, in support of relationship (c). As expected, the index
pressure effect is strongest in the wheat market and weakest in
the soybeans market. A 10% increase in the weight of index
traders results in a widening of the market basis of around 1.8–
2.5% for wheat and 0.2–0.4% for soybeans and corn, respec-
tively. The effect is of similar magnitude when using traders’ net
6 If including inventory in levels only, the coefficients are negative, approx-
imating table 2 results in Garcia et al. (2015, p. 18). Results are not reported
here, but available upon request.
long positions instead of traders’ market weight (see Table 3A
in the Online Appendix). Further, noncommercial speculators
have an index pressure-augmenting effect, while commercial
hedgers ease index pressure, as can be seen from the slight dif-
ference in the size of ˆβρw,ind between Model I and Model II. This
observation supports findings by Guilleminot et al. (2014).
To assess the possibility that traders’ weight is driven by the
size of the basis, we run a reverse regression with index traders’
market weight as the dependent variable, and the remaining
variables in Zt and Bt as regressors. Results are available in
Table 3A in the Online Appendix. The hypothesis that the mar-
ket weight of index traders is driven by the basis size is rejected
for all three markets. However, there is a positive relationship
between the storage premium and the weight of index traders. A
possible explanation is that with an increasing storage premium,
the futures contracts become less attractive. Index traders are
relatively insensitive to market-specific factors and, hence, do
not react as strongly as commercial hedgers and speculators to
this change. With other traders leaving the market, the relative
weight of index traders increases. Controlling for the storage
premium is therefore essential.
Diagnostic tests presented in Table 2 detect some autocorrela-
tion and heteroscedasticity in the residuals. These patterns could
stem from interpolation of inventory data, structural breaks,
or unbalanced regressions. We run two variations of Eq. (10)
Model I to test the robustness of our results. Interpolated in-
ventory data is replaced first by USDA monthly projections
of annual crop supply, and second, the observed quarterly in-
ventory data, using only four contracts at maturity. Results are
available in Table 4A in the Online Appendix. No autocorre-
lation or heteroscedasticity remains for both variations. When
using USDA projections, index pressure coefficients are close
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Table 2
Regression estimation results Eq. (10)
CBT wheat CBT corn CBT soybeans
I II I II I II
i = com i = ncom i = com i = ncom i = com i = ncom
c −2.670*** −2.720*** 2.145*** 2.167*** 3.077*** 3.162***
(−3.52) (−3.42) (7070) (7.51) (4.76) (5.00)
βγ 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.182*** 0.190*** 0.166*** 0.236***
(4.25) (4.32) (4.15) (3.87) (4.75) (5.24)
βyI 1.128*** 1.116*** −0.266*** −0.265*** −0.302*** −0.269***
(3.65) (3.52) (−3.90) (−3.87) (−3.57) (−3.05)
βy
I2
−0.110*** −0.109*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.010***
(−3.63) (−3.51) (3.89) (3.87) (3.61) (3.08)
βysu −0.005 −0.007 0.012** 0.012** 0.015*** 0.014**
(−0.30) (−0.36) (2.18) (2.26) (2.74) (2.18)
βρw,i 0.091* −0.262 0.004 −0.008 0.045* −0.059**
(1.89) (−1.60) (0.20) (−0.31) (1.86) (−2.30)
βρw,ind −0.183*** −0.247*** −0.036** −0.040*** 0.005 −0.018*
(−3.01) (−3.18) (−2.69) (−3.19) (0.55) (−1.77)
Diagnostics
R2 0.540 0.522 0.566 0.567 0.512 0.512
AR 2.452* 3.000* 2.279 2.295 0.148 0.028
Norm. 10.40*** 11.08*** 0.457 0.731 15.23*** 14.35***
Heter. 1.973* 1.540 0.518 0.508 2.066** 2.202**
Hans. 1.471 1.512 1.719 1.464 2.135** 2.7960***
Notes: Newey and West (1987) robust standard errors used for t-statistics in (.). *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. “R2” is the
R-square of the regression; “AR” is a test for first and second order autocorrelation in the residuals; “Norm.” is a test for normality of residuals; “Heter.” is a test
for heteroscedasticity in the residuals; and “Hans.” is the Hansen (1992) test for parameter stability to test for structural breaks. Models I and II differ only in the
definition of the risk premium with com for commercial hedgers and ncom for noncommercial speculators.
to previous results, but hedging pressure coefficients differ. The
seasonality of inventory data, which is missing from the pro-
jections of annual supply, seems to be picked up by hedging
pressure which is correlated with inventories, suggesting omit-
ted variable bias. When using the observed quarterly inventory
data, coefficient estimates are almost identical to results pre-
sented in Table 2. These results confirm that patterns in the
residuals are, in fact, caused by interpolation alone.
Some care must be exercised in interpreting regression results
for the soybeans market, as the Hansen (1992) test detects pa-
rameter instability, indicative of a structural break. The Markov
switching regressions, presented in Table 3, are better suited
in this case. Carry variables have been restricted to be identi-
cal over the two regimes, and coefficient estimates mirror what
has been reported in Table 2 (see Table 5A in the Online Ap-
pendix).7 The regimes identified for wheat, corn, and soybeans
closely track the episodes of convergence and nonconvergence,
as seen in Fig. 2. For the soybeans market, the identified non-
convergence regimes are of shorter duration.
Relationship (d) is confirmed for wheat and corn, with trader
positions significant in the nonconvergence regime, but insignif-
icant in the convergence regime. For wheat and soybeans mar-
7 Coefficients of carry variables were not found to vary across regimes and
were subsequently fixed. This is probably because carry variables explain limits
to arbitrage, but do not explain the extent of nonconvergence.
kets, price pressure estimates in the nonconvergence regime are
almost three times as strong as coefficients obtained without the
regime switch, that is, with averaging over both regimes. For
instance, a 10% increase in index pressure in the wheat market
results in a 5.3–7.5% decrease in the market basis under limits
to spatial arbitrage. For corn, the coefficient size in Eq. (11)
is similar to Eq. (10), probably due to the prevalence of the
nonconvergence regime over the sample period (Fig. 2).
The VSR was introduced only for the wheat market, not
for the corn or soybeans markets. This is potentially why the
expected duration of the nonconvergence regime is 10 times
longer for corn than for wheat. For soybeans, the Markov model
only identifies those periods of convergence failure which show
a very large basis at maturity. Thus, episodes of nonconvergence
are identified as being of relatively short duration, with the
likelihood of a transition from a nonconvergence regime to
convergence as high as 70–80%. The fact that the convergence
regime identified for the soybeans market is likely to cover some
periods of nonconvergence explains the significance of hedging
pressure in both the convergence and nonconvergence regimes.
Econometric results presented here highlight the key role of
inventory and storage costs in explaining the occurrence of pro-
longed nonconvergence through limits to arbitrage. However,
these factors fail to explain the extent of nonconvergence. In-
stead, results strongly support the hypothesis that the extent
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Table 3
Markov switching regression estimation results of Eq. (11)
CBT wheat CBT corn CBT soybeans
I II I II I II
i = com i = ncom i = com i = ncom i = com i = ncom
Regime 1
c −1.877*** −4.668*** 1.439*** 1.537*** 2.895*** 3.068***
(−5.4055) (−14.079) (14.430) (18.453) (28.337) (41.044)
βρw,i 0.337** −0.450** −0.012 0.003 0.119*** −0.160***
(2.4234) (−2.5687) (−0.7070) (0.1734) (3.8108) (−4.7568)
βρw,ind −0.525*** −0.752*** −0.043*** −0.040*** −0.002 −0.062***
(−4.5118) (−5.9266) (−3.9948) (−4.3093) (−0.1124) (−3.9490)
Regime 2
c −1.615*** −3.206*** 1.480*** 1.637*** 2.872*** 3.312***
(−6.7520) (−17.541) (13.242) (15.954) (34.644) (50.958)
βρw,i 0.003 0.006 −0.032 0.025 0.044*** −0.042***
(0.0708) (0.1114) (−1.2621) (0.7967) (2.957) (−2.6148)
βρw,ind −0.047 −0.048 −0.017 −0.007 0.010 −0.011
(−1.3732) (−1.0753) (−0.6217) (−0.2422) (1.6160) (−1.6179)
Transition probabilities and expected duration
P11 0.684193 0.582662 0.972492 0.971676 0.189768 0.266421
P22 0.924274 0.925231 0.899738 0.898475 0.903505 0.885593
P12 0.315807 0.417338 0.027508 0.028324 0.810232 0.733579
P21 0.075726 0.074769 0.100262 0.101525 0.096495 0.114407
Exp1 3.166487 2.396137 36.35285 35.30608 1.234214 1.363180
Exp2 13.20554 13.37449 9.973823 9.849800 10.36328 8.740734
Notes: Constant transition probabilities: P(i, k) = P(s(t) = k | s(t – 1) = i); Exp1 and Exp2 are expected duration of regime 1 and 2. P11, P12, P22, and P21 are the
transition probabilities. Starting value is 0. HAC standard errors are used. (.) z-statistic. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.
Models I and II differ only in the definition of the risk premium with com for commercial hedgers and ncom for noncommercial speculators.
of nonconvergence is explained better by index and hedging
pressure effects.
5. Is a VSR the solution?
The VSR was designed to successively narrow the gap be-
tween the storage premium at the exchange and the storage
rate in the physical market. Effective since the July 2010 con-
tracts’ maturity, the storage rate increases at each contract’s
maturity, as long as financial full carry prevails (CME Group,
2009). However, even though the VSR effectively eliminates
the “wedge,” γt − δt − y(It ), thereby enforcing convergence, it
has no effect on the risk premium, ρt .
In the case of the CBT wheat market, feedback mechanisms
between the cash and futures markets, resulting from enforced
convergence, led to an unwarranted increase in the cash market
price despite abundant supply. With forced convergence, it
became 5 US$ per bushel less for U.S. consumers to buy
feed wheat from Canada than domestically (see Figure 2A in
the Online Appendix). As financial full carry prevailed, the
exchange premium for wheat successively increased until the
end of 2011, to 20 cents (US$) a bushel per month, while the
premium for corn and soybeans remained as low as 5 cents
(US$) a bushel per month. Storage charges appeared to heavily
overshoot, reflecting the extent to which futures and physical
markets previously departed. This is because exchange storage
charges were compensating not only for δt but also ρt in Eq. (9).
With financial full carry prevailing, the increase in the ex-
change storage premium was fully reflected in the CBT wheat
calendar spread, which increased with the VSR until the end of
2011, as predicted by Eq. (7). Since such a development in the
calendar spread implies that deferred futures contracts gained
in value, relative to closer-to-maturity contracts, farmers were
misled, planting and storing additional wheat, despite already
abundant supply (Stebbins, 2011).
The case of CBT wheat clearly shows that the VSR can only
partially restore the functioning of grain futures markets. Unless
index pressure is curbed also, the futures premium spills over
to the cash market, resulting in a price increase unwarranted by
market fundamentals. Knock-on effects on the term structure
via Eq. (7) undermine the information service that grain com-
modity futures markets provide to farmers. Despite the success
of the VSR in restoring convergence and hedging effectiveness,
the price discovery function of the CBT wheat market remains
impaired.
6. Conclusion
This article shows that index investment into grain futures
markets drives a premium of futures prices over cash prices.
This index pressure effect is present but concealed in times of
effective spatial arbitrage and only visible in times of limits
to spatial arbitrage. If limits to spatial arbitrage are present,
the effect is manifested in nonconvergence between cash and
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Fig. 2. Markov switching regimes.
Note: Smoothed Markov regime witching probabilities (left axis) and market basis (right axis). Figures corresponding to regression results presented in Table 3.
futures prices of large scope. If spatial arbitrage is effective, al-
though concealed behind feedback mechanisms between cash
and futures prices, the effect may spill over to cash mar-
kets, leading to a higher price level than warranted by market
fundamentals.
Previous studies have linked the extent of nonconvergence to
a mismatch in storage cost at exchange-registered warehouses
and commercial storage rates. Although empirical evidence pre-
sented here supports this theory, it has been shown that the
storage cost differential fails to explain empirically, as well
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as theoretically, the extent of nonconvergence. Instead, the ex-
cess in market basis is successfully explained by index pressure
effects.
Despite the success of the VSR in restoring convergence in
the CBT wheat market, insights gained from this article suggest
that the problems underlying the extent of nonconvergence re-
main unresolved. This is especially worrisome because, if the
hypothesis put forward here is correct, the two key functions
of commodity futures markets are at stake. First, if spatial arbi-
trage mechanisms are effective, then financial liquidity driving
the futures market price is likely to spill over to the cash mar-
ket price, impeding the market’s price discovery function and
leading to a higher price level across futures and cash mar-
kets. Second, if spatial arbitrage is limited, hedging and, hence,
risk management become ineffective under a volatile and large
basis.
The VSR can only effectively restore the functioning of
commodity futures market if index pressure is curbed. The
Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 empowered the CFTC to impose po-
sition limits for traders other than commercial hedgers. How-
ever, since index positions are synchronized, the total market
weight of index traders and trend-following speculators needs
to be monitored and curbed, but not necessarily the positions
by individual traders—an argument that has already been made
by Schmidt (2016, pp. 134–139). If commercial hedgers out-
weigh index traders, the latter provide valuable liquidity and
ease hedging pressure. An outright ban on index traders and
portfolio insurance instruments is therefore undesirable. What
is needed instead is a policy that carefully monitors and bal-
ances the composition of traders in the market. Unfortunately,
this appears politically unattainable as the Act will most likely
be weakened rather than strengthened under the new U.S. pres-
idency of 2017.
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